GMA appointed new Chief Justice

[leonleon]

Agree. Corona should decline...

9909:gotcha:

+1,000,000. Kaya lang mukhang sabik din sa kapangyarihan itong si CORONA eh.

[niwde11]

i think it is more as an opportunity. if noynoy will appoint the new CJ, for sure he will select Carpio (unless gusto noynoy mag alsa balutan sila Cruz et al.) saka they perceived Corona as a GMA puppet.

[niwde11]

Noynoy should have sent discreetly (but not traceable sa kanya) an emissary na lang kay Corona and tell him to decline the appointment and Noynoy would eventually appoint him come June 30. (pwede kaya yon?)

i think this will be disadvantageous to noynoy. kahit discreet lalabas pa rin yan lalo na pag pumiyok si Corona. if i were him, ill take oath to Corona. just be civil and just hide noynoys real feeling so everybody will be guessing his stand.

[Gerbo]

Noynoy should have sent discreetly (but not traceable sa kanya) an emissary na lang kay Corona and tell him to decline the appointment and Noynoy would eventually appoint him come June 30. (pwede kaya yon?)

But it seems Corona is a willing accomplice of GMA.

And according to Winnie Monsod he is not that CJ material.

[vito corleone]

But it seems Corona is a willing accomplice of GMA.

And according to Winnie Monsod he is not that CJ material.

so what else is new? buti pa nga tong corona e at least linya nya. . .manicurist, gardener, aerobics instructor. . .makapal at matigas na lang talaga ang pagmumukha nyang si pandak

[TholitzReloaded]

so what else is new? buti pa nga tong corona e at least linya nya. . .manicurist, gardener, aerobics instructor. . .makapal at matigas na lang talaga ang pagmumukha nyang si pandak

Sobrang kapal ng mukha ng GMA na yan! aalis nalang magiiwan pa ng souvenir.

[OldSchoolHack]

Wish ko lang wala nang milagrong gagawin si pandak bago July 1. Pero wishful thinking yan. Masahol talaga si GMA. Pati CJ-judiciary todo pakialam niya.

Ano pa kayang mga hindi lantad na overnight appointments ginawa ni pandak?

[Rizal]

There is a strong possibility then that the following will be working against Aquino

The Judicial Office - Corona as Chief Justice
the Senate - Manny Villar as Senate President
The Congress - Arroyo as Speaker
the Vice Presidents Office - Binay as Vice President

The Military kaya???
The church is also divided against Noynoy because of some of the controversial positions that he took which is against catholic dogma

[CVT]

Noynoy should have sent discreetly (but not traceable sa kanya) an emissary na lang kay Corona and tell him to decline the appointment and Noynoy would eventually appoint him come June 30. (pwede kaya yon?)

Puwede bro.... Not necessarily appointing him outright,- but appoint the lady Justice who will retire in a year's time. With the agreement that Corona will be appointed "after" her... (kung kailan hindi natin alam.....)

9909:gotcha:

[daimengrui]

This is a valid gray area in the Constitution.

Article VII Section 15 of the Constitution states:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

One of the best arguments I've seen on the internet supporting the SC ruling allowing PGMA to appoint the next CJ was made by Judge Gabriel T. Ingles and I quote:

First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.

The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure.

True, the constitution indeed articulates the separation of Powers between the 3 Branches of Government. Judge Ingles opens with this statement because he believes that the prohibition cannot be applied to Supreme Court appointees because the sanctity of this principle is implied and enforced throughout the 1987 Constitution.

He would have been truly correct except for the fact that Article VII Section 15 is a prohibition to the President the Commander in Chief and Head of the Executive Department and not a prohibition or limitation imposed on the Judicial Body.

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.

Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.

That particular statute may be interpret as, an incumbent president, elected or acting shall not make appointments. This is also unqualified meaning ALL types of appointments. This prohibits an entire action. What action? Making Appointments. Over what period? 2 mos immediately before a presidential election and up to the end of his term. What is the only exception? Except temporary appointments to Executive Positions. When is this exception applied? When 1) there is a threat to public safety 2) prejudice to public service is imminent. That is the ONLY exception to this.

In reality, this defines the limits of the Presidential power to appoint and not a restriction on when or how SC members are appointed. We are still talking about the Executive Department here. *emphasis added*.

The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates.

Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.

On the contrary, the Framers need not extend the prohibition on appointments in the Judiciary because it was implied that only the Presidential Power to appoint is being clipped here. That power is being delimited with absolution. With the only exception described in that section.

The supreme court justices in their desire to protect the implied sanctity of the separation of powers between the 3 branches of government, modified the law by "Legislating from the Bench" (Legislation thru Interpretation) and extended the Presidents powers to appoint by excluding itself from the appointment ban.

Third. To hold that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

Again, Judge Ingles is referring to the implied intent here and not an explicit statute as reference. Surely he also knew that the intent of Article 15 Section 15 is to limit an executive power. It just so happen that that power encompasses a Supreme Court Justice appointment. Surely the Supreme Court will still function without 1 justice for 60 days?

There is no prejudice to public service nor endangerment of public safety. The separation of powers argument is a twist of the gray area of the law. The lack of further exception means it encompasses all Presidential appointments. It prohibits a constitutionally bestowed right of the President in specific conditions and with specific exceptions. Had the framers intend an exception for SC appointments surely they would have also written it here. They did not. The careful wording of the Constitution is clear. "SHALL NOT MAKE". It didn't say, No Supreme Court Justice may be appointed at this period so and so... It said the President or an Acting President SHALL NOT MAKE... By interpreting the law as such, they violated the separation of powers of the 3 branches by indirectly increasing an outgoing President's executive powers.

The SC is also guilty of increasing the influence of an outgoing president by allowing such appointment.