With con-ass, con-con, this Camara i like!

http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquirer...94/Guinea-coup

The military coup that seized power following the death of President Lansana Conte of Guinea in West Africa on Dec. 22 was a classic textbook model of a swift and bloodless power grab seldom seen in the history of coup-prone Third World countries in Africa and Asia, including Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.


It stood on its head the commonalities in some of these messy coups in that the Guinea power seizure was successfully staged by junior officers, not by entrenched generals. The successful junta sacked 22 generals. What made the Guinea coup different is that it was led by an unknown captain, Moussa Dadis Camara.


The coup came in the midst of the global financial meltdown that dominated the news since the third quarter of 2008 and, indeed, stole the thunder from the economic catastrophe. It reminded the globalized economic order that the days of coups are not over and military malcontents in the lower echelons of military hierarchies can overturn the political order in their own image of political change. The coup seemed out of place in the milieu of the disheartening news on the economic crisis.


The red-bereted Captain Camara shocked the world by appearing on national TV, announcing the dissolution of the government and suspension of the Constitution just hours after the death of President Conte, who ruled Guinea for 24 years and left a trail of corruption that impoverished the resource-rich country.


The swift and bloodless coup sent Third World countries’ military academies into a review of their archives for models of coups and revived the hopes of junior officers that they could benefit from the success of Camara and his junta.


In the history of Philippine coups since 1986, coups started with conspiratorial colonels and majors clustered around Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan, not with general staff officers like Chief of Staff Gen. Fabian Ver and the then-chief of the Constabulary, Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos. The Guinea coup could only have given heart to the cabal of Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes, who led the Oakwood Mutiny of 2003 following in the tradition of Colonel Honasan. A review of coups at the Philippine Military Academy archives needs to examine why the Honasan and Trillanes coup attempts failed. Camara’s coup might offer some lessons, such as, that general staff officers are not always the backbone of successful coups. The Thai coups are not always good models.They have been too general staff rank-oriented — too establishment- and status quo-inclined.


The Camara junta announced its priorities after suspending the Constitution and dissolving the government; and pledged to step down in 2010 and hold elections after tackling corruption. After he declared himself president, Camara’s first decision was to dismiss 22 senior military officers, including the chief of staff, Gen. Ibrahima Diallo, and the chiefs of the army, navy and air force. The demotions were effective immediately and it was announced that the military heads of the regime under dictator Conte would be reassigned to other jobs in the army. Trucks filled with soldiers were reported to have arrived outside the gate of General Diallo’s house after the coup announcement. The soldiers searched his home, saying, “We are here to see what he is hiding.” The general was not home during the raid. In the sweep, there was no violence reported.


“I know power is sweet,” Camara told the press. “But look at this building, what do you see? Why are we here in this heat, when we could be in air-conditioned offices cutting corrupt deals?” He said the new military leaders would execute anyone who embezzled state funds and freeze the country’s numerous mining contract.


Camara, prior to the coup, was in charge of supplying army vehicles with fuel. Defending himself against those questioning his ability to lead the former French colony’s 10 million people, he said: “My qualification is patriotism. You don’t need to go to Oxford, Cambridge or Harvard University to run a country.

“I went to a university in Guinea and studied public finance. My master’s thesis was on the intervention of the International Monetary Fund in Africa, Latin America and Asia. So basically I am an economist.” The CNDD has named a banker as prime minister, Kabien Komara, former administrator of Egypt-based African Export-Import Bank. Inside Guinea, the coup was widely welcomed after 24 years of repressive rule by Conte.


Cellou Dalein, who was prime minister under Conte between December 2004 and April 2006, said: “There was no resistance because of a crisis of legitimacy surrounding the country’s institutions and because of the misery” of the Guinean people. Al Jazeera news agency reported that, according to Dalein, who became head of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces in Guinea in November 2007, “In 1995, only 40 percent of the population lived on less than a dollar a day.”


Guinea sits on one-third of the world’s bauxite reserves, the raw material used to make aluminum. It also has important reserves of gold, diamond and other minerals. Because of corruption and mismanagement, Guinea ranks 160 out of 177 in the United Nations’ development scale.


The coup of the CNDD staged the second military takeover in Africa this year. The CNDD has cemented its grip on power quickly after appointing its members as defense and security ministers. Camara has pledged he would not seek election to the presidency.


All messianic military leaders who had seized power in the name of national salvation and patriotism stayed in power longer than they had pledged. That their regimes have turned out less corrupt than those they replaced is not borne out by records.


Is a benevolent dictator anachronistic?