The engine was started and stabilized at idle RPM for approximately 3 minutes while the initial leak check was performed by the two journeymen mechanics that were working around the engine. One of these two mechanics then called the captain on the ground intercom system and reported that a small oil leak was detected, and he requested that the captain run the engine at 70 percent power for 2 minutes to conduct further checks. The captain complied with the request, after verifying with the mechanic that the area around the airplane was clear.
Witnesses on the ground and in the airplane stated that they saw the mechanic on the outboard side of the engine stand up, step into the inlet hazard zone, and become ingested into the intake of the engine. This occurred about 90 seconds into the 70-percent-power engine run. The mechanic was not wearing any type of safety equipment or lanyard to prevent the ingestion. Upon sensing a buffet, the captain immediately retarded the power lever back to the idle position. The first officer stated to the captain that something went into the engine and the captain immediately cut off the start lever to stop the engine run.
The mechanic who was fatally injured was hired by the FBO in November 1997, and had been a certified mechanic for 40 years. He received maintenance training from the airline regarding on-call maintenance procedures in March 2004, nearly two years prior to the accident. The airline provided training to contract maintenance stations in the form of classroom instruction, interactive computer based scenarios, and training videos. Specific training (either initial or recurrent) regarding ground engine runs and associated hazards was not provided to the contract mechanics by the airline.
According to the surviving contract mechanic that worked around the engine with the fatally injured mechanic, maintenance instructions were not needed for the engine run because engine oil leaks were a common occurrence, and because of his past experience as a mechanic.